Yes-No Voting, Abstention, and the UN Security Council (1- or 2-term thesis)
Under the direction of: William Zwicker
Dear Students,
I've found that it is very helpful for students to get a head start by doing some background reading before the official start of a thesis. If you will be working with me, please get in touch as soon as you know - in particular, at least 2 weeks before exams for Spring term 2007. Drop by my office (Bailey 200B) or send e-mail: zwickerw@union.edu.
Suppose we have a yes-no voting system - one designed, for example, to either approve or disapprove of a proposal. An important example is the UN Security Council, which has 5 permanent members (China, France, Russia, the US and the UK), 10 temporary members, and requires 9 or more votes in favor in order to pass a proposal, with each of the "Big 5" having veto power. Until recently, most mathematical descriptions of this type of system assumed that each voter is limited to a vote of "yes" or "no". Recent work has produced new mathematics that better describes reality, in which countries also have the option to abstain or to be absent. Historically, this option has had important effects on UN decisions, with the Korean War providing a notable example.
Recently, in fact, there have been debates in the UN about changing the structure of the Security Council, by adding a new "middle tier" of countries (including, possibly, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and others). These new seats might also be permanent . . . or maybe not, and that might also carry a veto . . . or maybe not. It's very controversial.
The politicians almost surely don't know the mathematics, and so they may be unaware of some compromise possibilities for how a middle tier might function. I suggest that we try to invent some brand-new systems. Then, we'll compare them on the basis of how much influence a middle tier country would get, in contrast to the influence of one of the Big Five, or of one of the nonpermanent members.
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