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Some Antinomies in Epistemic Game Theory and the Modal Logics of Knowledge, Belief, and Rationality

by

Herbert Gintis
Santa Fe Institute and Central European University

September 10, 2010
4:00 pm
Bailey Hall 207

Refreshments will be served in Bailey Hall 204 at 3:45 pm


Abstract:

I will first explain the concept of Nash equilibrium and show the centrality of the "common knowledge of rationality" (CKR) in showing that players in a game will play Nash equilibria. I then show that CKR is a highly implausible epistemic assumption drawing on research in paradoxes in the modal logics of knowledge and belief.


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