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Llull's Thirteenth-Century Election System Computationally Resists Bribery and Control


Lane A. Hemaspaandra
Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester

April 24, 2008
12:50 pm
Bailey Hall 207

Lunch will be served at 12:30 in Bailey Hall 204


Can computational complexity theory be used as a shield to prevent bribery and control of elections? We show that an election system developed by the 13th-century Catalan mystic Ramon Llull and the closely related Copeland election system are both resistant to all standard types of (constructive) electoral control. This is the most comprehensive resistance to control yet achieved by any natural election system whose winner problem is in polynomial time. In addition, we show that Llull and Copeland voting are broadly resistant to bribery attacks, we show how network flows can be used to find bribery attacks in certain settings, and we integrate the potential irrationality of voter preferences into many of our results. Joint work with Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, and Joerg Rothe.

For additional information, send e-mail to math@union.edu or call (518) 388-6246.
Up: Student Seminars for 2008
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