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Anyone but Him: The Complexity of Precluding an Alternative

by

Edith Hemaspaandra
Department of Computer Science Rochester Institute of Technology

April 24, 2008
4:00 pm
Bailey Hall 207

Refreshments will be served in Bailey 204 at 3:45


Abstract:

Preference aggregation in a multiagent setting is a central issue in both human and computer contexts. We study in terms of complexity the vulnerability of preference aggregation to destructive control. That is, we study the ability of an election's chair to, through such mechanisms as voter/candidate addition/suppression/partition, ensure that a particular candidate (equivalently, alternative) does not win. And we study the extent to which election systems can make it impossible, or computationally costly (NP-complete), for the chair to execute such control. Among the systems we study---plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting---we find cases where systems immune or computationally resistant to a chair choosing the winner nonetheless are vulnerable to the chair blocking a victory. Beyond that, we see that among our studied systems no one system offers the best protection against destructive control. Rather, the choice of a preference aggregation system will depend closely on which types of control one wishes to be protected against. We also find concrete cases where the complexity of or susceptibility to control varies dramatically based on the choice among natural tie-handling rules. This is joint work with Lane Hemaspaandra (University of Rochester) and Joerg Rothe (University of Duesseldorf).


For additional information, send e-mail to math@union.edu or call (518) 388-6246.
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